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Abstract
When user fee exemptions were introduced for children under five years of age in Niger, front-line staff in the
health system were not consulted in advance, and various obstacles seriously hindered the policy’s
implementation. Health workers developed two types of coping strategies. The first dealt with shortcomings of the
policy implementation process related to management tools, drug stocks, co-existence of the fee exemption and
cost recovery systems, and, above all, supply management for medicines (ordering from private companies, issuing
makeshift prescriptions). The second involved clientelism, circumvention of regulations, and misappropriation of
resources. Adverse effects have arisen due to both the failings of the health system and the practices of health
workers. These include a focus on the commercial management of patients, the most ‘costly’ of whom sometimes
find themselves being refused treatment, patients roaming in search of medicines and treatment, and a decline in
quality of care.
Introduction
The increase in the number of children under the age of
five attending health facilities over the past seven years
in Niger is unprecedented. Whereas in 2005 there were
1,253,199 new consultations recorded for children under
five, in 2010, that number reached 5,554,288 [1,2]. This
sudden increase in the use of health services by this age
group has been largely linked to recent user fee exemp-
tion policies [3], although other strategies have, in the
past, had similar but less spectacular effects. These have
included the construction of new health centres and the
creation of health districts under the Bamako Initiative,
large-scale vaccination campaigns, the Integrated Man-
agement of Childhood Illness (IMCI) program, and the
childhood malnutrition eradication program. In April
2006, the Nigerien State introduced full fee exemption
for preventive and curative healthcare for children
under five. This targeted abolition marked the end of
point-of-service user fees for this age group, although
fees still applied for the majority of paediatric services.
It should be noted, also, that some services were already
free, in particular those of a preventive nature, due
more to certain policies that predated the Bamako
Initiative than to vertical programs such as vaccinations.
It was against an international backdrop of public
health considerations combined with the pursuit of
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) [4,5] that Niger,
like other West African countries, introduced this new
fee exemption policy [6]. The same spectacular increase
in curative paediatric consultations has been observed in
all countries where such policies have been introduced.
However, undesirable effects have also manifested, such
as declining quality of care (mainly due to drug
shortages), healthcare workers’ perceptions of increased
workloads, and weakening of health centres’ financial
positions caused by reimbursement delays. These
impacts have already been examined in several studies
[7-11]. However, those studies are inadequate in several
ways: i) they rely essentially on quantitative methods,
and those that include qualitative data do so only very
partially; ii) they tend to highlight service use increases
without sufficiently analysing implementation; and
iii) no qualitative study has focused specifically on the
implementation of fee exemption measures for children
in health centres. A 2009 review of the literature high-
lighted some of these research gaps [12] and, to our
knowledge, these persist in more recent publications. In
West Africa, in particular, health anthropology has
shown only a marginal interest in the recent fee exemp-
tion measures compared to other disciplines, such as
public health and epidemiology. In this article we hope
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to narrow this gap somewhat by deciphering the coping
strategies adopted by health workers when implement-
ing fee exemptions–strategies that include practices,
interactions, negotiations, and contradictions. By using a
qualitative approach, our aim is to give substance to the
quantitative data [13] in order to better understand the
successes and failures of the implementation of the user
fee exemption for children under five.
Method
The approach we adopted involved conducting mono-
graphic studies in which we observed actors and listened
to their statements, in four health districts (DS) of Niger:
Gaweye, in the urban community of Niamey; Say, a rural
to semi-rural district 54 km outside Niamey in Tillabéry
region; and Dosso and Loga, two DSs in Dosso region,
136 km from Niamey. The studies were carried out over
different periods between 2009 and 2011, with surveys
lasting an average of two months per site [14,15].
The semi-structured interviews were conducted with
men and women from eight strategic groups: (1) admin-
istrative personnel; (2) healthcare delivery teams at all
levels; (3) support staff (e.g. unskilled workers, ambu-
lance drivers); (4) management committee (COGES)
members; (5) paying users; (6) parents of children eligi-
ble for the fee exemption; (7) non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs); and (8) private pharmacies. We met
them either in the healthcare facilities or, for users, in
their homes. We carried out a total of 142 formal and
informal interviews, 12 of which were group interviews.
Altogether, 177 people were interviewed.
We consulted a wide range of documents: forms and
checklists for supervision, stock control, and identifica-
tion of indigents; purchase orders for materials, consum-
ables, and essential generic drugs (EGDs); treatment
guidelines; notebooks; receipts; discharge registers;
prescription registers; fee exemption registers; and EGD
distribution registers. Observations were carried out in
the four health districts covered by the study, in particu-
lar in the four district hospitals and five integrated
health centres. The collected data were processed using
thematic analysis.
Context
After six years of implementation of the user fee exemp-
tion for children under five, Niger remains one of the
countries with the worst health indicators in the world
for this age group. Despite having decreased from 273.8/
1,000 in 1998 to 130.5/1,000 in 2010, infant and child
mortality remains at a critical level [16]. Many children
continue to die of malaria, diarrhoeal diseases, respira-
tory disorders, meningitis, and measles in the first five
years of life. Health coverage in 2010 was estimated at
49.44% [2]. Health infrastructure and equipment are
inadequate and frequently defective. There are serious
human resources problems: shortages, poor staff alloca-
tion, and excessive health worker mobility.
The decree ratifying user fee exemptions for children
under five was issued in April 2006. The recent fee
exemption measures were essentially financed using the
State’s own resources, but with temporary financial sup-
port from the Agence Française de Développement
(AFD), assistance in the form of inputs from interna-
tional institutions such as the Global Fund and UNICEF,
and local support from some NGOs. Health facilities are
reimbursed retroactively according to fixed prices
assigned to each of the free services provided, which are
based on the cost recovery pricing system introduced in
the early 1990s. Theoretically, the free services provided
over the course of one month are supposed to be reim-
bursed at the end of the following month. The DS,
which was our primary level of investigation within the
Table 1 Interviews per strategic group
Strategic groups Respondents Individual interviews Group interviews Total
Administrative personnel Regional health authority (DRSP)
Regional hospital (CHR)
District supervisory team (ECD)
11 11





COGES members 26 4 30
Support personnel Unskilled workers, ambulance drivers 13 13
NGO 1 1
Private pharmacy 1 1
Paying users 3 3 6
Fee exemption beneficiaries Parents of children under 5 years of age 18 2 20
Total 130 12 142
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health pyramid, generally comprises a district hospital
(HD), some integrated health centres (CSI), and, at the
front-line, dispensaries (CS). At the time of our study,
three of our four DSs, i.e., Gaweye, Say, and Dosso,
were not receiving any community-based support from
international NGOs; the fourth, Loga DS, was supported
by Mercy Corps.
Like the entire country, the four DSs operate in accor-
dance with Bamako Initiative principles. Nonetheless,
they all participate in the same common fund; that is,
the cost-recovery revenues generated by healthcare facil-
ities are centralized at the district level. This joint fund
is managed by the departmental management committee
(i.e., the district COGES) and the district management
team (ECD). It is used to purchase EGDs and manage-
ment tools, and to pay the salaries of certain contractual
workers as well as fixed costs, such as water and electri-
city bills.
Initial trials and errors
In the four DSs under study, as in the rest of the country,
the user fee exemption was officially introduced, in most
cases verbally, to health workers at general meetings held
in the districts. In Dosso region the announcement was
made within a month after the decree. In Say and
Gaweye, on the other hand, these general meetings were
held later, in 2007. The offhand way in which the
announcement was made in Gaweye, in particular, is
noteworthy: at a general meeting to present the results of
health facility audits, information about the fee exemp-
tion was a ‘miscellaneous’ agenda item, relegated to the
end of the meeting.
The health workers received the news of the new sys-
tem with considerable concern:
“Who will reimburse all the money the hospitals will
spend on medicines, or on management tools and other
things?!” (Health worker, Gaweye DS)
“I asked whether we’re going to deliver children’s pro-
ducts, or what?” (District COGES member, Say DS)
“We told him [the Regional Director of Public Health]
all our concerns regarding the application of this fee
exemption and the risks for us in terms of drug stock-
outs, and especially [regarding the fact] that nothing
had been done or planned prior to the adoption of this
fee exemption system.” (Manager, Loga DS)
Based on the imperative tone used by the health
authorities, all the health workers perceived the
announcement as an order. Three expressions surfaced
repeatedly in their descriptions of it: “an order”, “a
directive”, “this is not open to discussion”.
Many members of the health committees (COSA) and
management committees (COGES) in the different
healthcare facilities did not agree with the measure, but
they implemented it. The COGESs of Loga and Dosso
considered the fee exemption to be an attack on commu-
nity participation. They saw it as something imposed by
the government and believed they had no option but to
submit to it.
In reality, the main bearers of the information in the
DS did not understand the nature of this new measure
themselves. Their task was rendered all the more diffi-
cult by the fact that they were not equipped with argu-
ments for “getting the message across”. They were
merely the conveyors of information from above, i.e.,
from the Office of the President and the Ministry of
Public Health, and had played no part in formulating
either the measure or the conditions of its implementa-
tion. When faced with the health workers’ urgent ques-
tions regarding how this measure would actually be
implemented on the ground, the managers were evasive.
As one health worker told us:
“What are they going to answer? They said this was
just a beginning, they would see, they themselves couldn’t
say anything about it. They said it was a system they
wanted to establish and that they would see later.”
(Health worker, Gaweye DS)
Thus the information sessions in the districts were
dominated by a feeling of uncertainty and a sense of
embarking on new ground. The uneasiness of certain
members of the ECD should be pointed out here, in
particular the communicators (the most senior people),
who had long defended and carried the message of the
Bamako Initiative to the public and now had to convey
to those same people the opposite message of fee
exemption. In other words, it was difficult for them to
have to defend the requirement for financial contribu-
tions from the community, on one hand, while also
talking about exempting over half of the health centres’
patients, on the other. As one management team mem-
ber in a district (Filingué) not included in this study
lamented: “If you take a decision, you have to take
responsibility for it. I passed on the information about
cost recovery, and now it [healthcare] is free of charge....”
This perceived contradiction in the change of direc-
tion of health policy generated a lot of frustration
among the health workers, who had been convinced of
the rightness of the earlier measures.
When providing free consultations and medicines to the
beneficiaries, the health workers had to write receipts to
obtain reimbursement from the State. In reality, nobody
knew what needed to be done. In the beginning, the
receipts were carefully stored in boxes and presented
together with summary sheets, which served as invoices,
to the fee exemption unit at the end of the month. The
latter was soon swamped by a deluge of receipts from all
the DSs and requested that only summary invoices be sub-
mitted, without receipts. Adjusting to the new system also
affected the stocking of drugs, which involved physically
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separating those intended for the cost recovery system,
that is, for the resale pharmacy, from those reserved for
distribution under the fee exemption system. The operat-
ing mechanism was slightly modified in certain districts
that had opted for the ‘segregated’ cost recovery approach,
in which services were charged separately from drugs.
This approach was replaced everywhere by the fixed-price
approach (covering both services and drugs), as the fee
exemption system is based on fixed-price reimbursement.
Lastly, functions such as the ‘fee-exemption focal point’
were created within the regional health authorities (DRSP)
and district management teams (ECD) to ensure transpar-
ency in the fee exemption system monitoring and
management.
The abrupt introduction of the fee exemption policy
reflected an enormous lack of preparation. It was also
deeply indicative of the gulf between a central level
where all decision-making and development of technical
tools are concentrated and a peripheral level that is rele-
gated to a purely implementation role.
Ups and downs in the user fee exemption
implementation
Operational deficiencies became apparent from the out-
set and persisted. Yet certain districts overcame some of
the difficulties and managed to implement the system
better than others. In this section we specifically examine,
for each of these two scenarios, the coping strategies
adopted by the health workers and users to overcome the
constraints of the system, as well as their outcomes.
Stocking essential generic drugs on credit
The National Office for Pharmaceutical and Chemical
Products (ONPPC) is the central public agency respon-
sible for importing medical inputs, in particular EGDs,
and supplying them to the health centres at affordable
prices. In principle, the health centres are supposed to
submit their orders for inputs to the State enterprise. If
a district’s requirement cannot be met there, it then can
approach private companies. However, the ONPPC has
been experiencing management difficulties for some
time and has been unable to fulfil its role as main sup-
plier due to financial and organisational crises that
cause frequent breakdowns in supplies [17]. These
breakdowns can involve not only much-needed drugs,
but also more common products that it is difficult to
imagine running out of in a healthcare facility, such as
“simple cotton wool”, as one health worker reported.
Moreover, a large part of the State subsidies paid to
health facilities goes through the ONPPC in the form of
drug allocations. However, due to the latter’s manage-
ment problems, various DSs do not manage to obtain
these EGDs. Conversely, sometimes the DSs receive sup-
plies of drugs they already have in abundance.
“For example, they say: ‘you ordered 200, we’re giving
you 50.’ For the cost of the other 150, you have to see
what’s available from them, even if nothing else is
needed. You have to take what they have in bulk to fulfil
the order.” (Health worker, Say DS)
Thus the health centres are not supplied on the basis of
their orders, but rather according to what products are
available from the ONPPC. These problems are com-
pounded by the long wait for deliveries. For these rea-
sons, most health centres have gradually ended up using
private companies as their main suppliers, even though
these are only meant to have a complementary role to
the ONPPC. Health centres enjoy more flexible terms
with private companies, an important consideration
given their reduced income: they pay less for certain pro-
ducts than with the ONPPC (the trade-off being poten-
tially poorer quality and sub-optimal storage), supplies
can be purchased on credit, and products are delivered
quickly. Moreover, they qualify for discounts, generally
referred to as ‘rebates’, which vary between five and ten
percent of order totals. In some instances, these ‘rebates’
are actually hidden commissions pocketed by the person
submitting the order and not the health centre. Thus,
even while relying on these ‘guardian angel suppliers’,
health workers say they are conscious of the fact that
these are, first and foremost, commercial concerns to
which the health centres will have to repay enormous
debts.
Diversity of situations at the district level
If the State had actually managed to reimburse the
health centres for the free healthcare provided, those
centres’ incomes would have doubled or even tripled
[18], far surpassing the already considerable income
brought in through cost recovery. For example, in 2009
the direct revenue collected between January and April
alone in Gaweye DS totalled almost XOF 24,272,350.
However, because of erratic reimbursement–the core
problem associated with the fee exemption policy–
COGESs have been forced to deplete any financial
reserves they had managed to accumulate.
This financial failure was not consistent across the
country, however, and there are a few rare DSs that
have fared better financially. One such case is Loga DS.
Like all the health centres, it experienced difficulties in
the early days of the fee exemption, but unlike many
others, those problems disappeared with the first reim-
bursements in 2008. In 2010, the district had XOF
48,000,000 in non-reimbursed invoices, but it had a
bank balance of XOF 35,000,000 and drug stocks with
an estimated value of XOF 30,000,000. Because of this,
the district health centre of Loga was identified as a
‘model’ in its local governance of the fee exemption, and
in August 2010 a mission from the COGES of Aguié DS
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went there to learn from its experience. Its success is
ascribed to rigorous organisation orchestrated by the
ECD, which ensures regular processing of data and care-
ful monitoring of management practices in the health-
care facilities. These good management practices
enabled the district to submit its invoices promptly.
Moreover, as mentioned above, the district benefits
from the local support of the NGO Mercy Corps, which
donated drugs worth XOF 69,000,000 in 2009. The
NGO also provided training in emergency obstetric care
and in management and community-building for the
members of the COSA and managers of the healthcare
facilities. This support helped the district to avoid EDG
stock-outs and provided access to sufficient funds to
ensure its operations. We have analysed similar support
received in other districts of Niger, such as Keita,
assisted by Médecins du Monde [19] and Téra and
Mayahi, assisted by Help (Ridde, Diarra, Moha, unpub-
lished report, available from author). Nevertheless, good
availability of financing and of EGDs does not necessa-
rily translate into a high level of attendance. One study
showed that the number of visits recorded in Loga DS
(before and since the fee exemption) was limited in
comparison to other districts (Baroy and Laouali,
unpublished report, available from author). This may
partially explain its coping ability, if we assume that
fewer visits also led to fewer problems than in other dis-
tricts with higher attendance.
These variations between the districts implicitly con-
firm that measures for removing financial barriers are
not always sufficient to ensure strong attendance at
healthcare services. Factors associated with the health-
care system itself (problems with the referral/evacuation
system, quality of care, clientelism, favouritism, poor
management, etc.) can also, like sociocultural and reli-
gious factors, present obstacles to accessing and using
health services [20]. These pose a real threat to the sus-
tainability of health policies.
Governing the implementation of fee exemption with the
legacies of the past
The ‘directive-to-implementation’ logic referred to
above–typical of the health system and in play from the
outset of the fee exemption, and which contributed to
the lack of preparation described earlier–continued to
dominate with the ‘extra centimes’ affair. In effect, while
caesareans were free of charge, patients still had to pay
the evacuation costs, which could equal or exceed the
cost of the procedure itself. To cope with this situation, a
payment of XOF 100 was exacted from each patient at
every episode of ill health and put toward funding free
medical evacuations [21]. This initiative originated in a
district of the Dosso region and spread throughout Niger.
While it proved to be effective in providing free evacua-
tions, the Ministry of Public Health swiftly prohibited the
inclusion of fee exemption beneficiaries in this system.
According to the health authorities, in making those ben-
eficiaries pay this extra contribution, health centres were
contravening the fee exemption policy. This decision,
which did not propose any alternative strategy, struck a
serious blow to the referral/evacuation system, which
relied heavily on these ‘extra centimes’. Some districts
were compelled to stop the free evacuations, even though
problems associated with medical evacuations are known
to be a contributing factor in the lack of continuity of
care for fee exemption beneficiaries.
Another directive was issued during the implementa-
tion: a ban on issuing prescriptions to patients targeted
by the fee exemption. Health workers were expected to
draw from the funds generated by cost recovery to pro-
vide free treatment to patients, pending reimbursement.
However, those reserves were depleted due to very long
reimbursement delays [22], which in turn impeded the
replenishment of EGD stocks. Because of stock-outs,
health workers were unable to provide free medicines to
the patients and so issued them with prescriptions. The
State prohibited this, thereby obliging them to send
patients away not only with no drugs, but also with no
possibility of buying them at the pharmacy. When faced
with this dilemma, some health workers followed the
directive despite their own misgivings, whereas others
defied it, either by providing anonymous prescriptions
on simple scraps of paper or by issuing properly com-
pleted prescription forms. They justified their actions
primarily on the basis of ethical considerations:
“You cannot turn a child away. We have a responsibil-
ity here.” (Medical officer, Gaweye HD)
“A child comes and we have no drugs and don’t issue
a prescription. We feel sorry for them. I, myself, issue the
prescription.” (Nurse, Gaweye CSI)
In reality, these problems that surfaced in the interac-
tions between the central and peripheral levels reflect a
bureaucratic governance model that is extremely hier-
archical [23]. Drug stock-out problems also occurred in
Ghana, prompting a return to a user payment system in
certain districts there [24].
Other structural malfunctions of the healthcare system
manifested in key services across all levels of the hierar-
chy. We observed them particularly in the management
of medicines. The issue of the unavailability of drugs is
not only a financial one, but very likely also one of man-
agement. For instance, when stocks of paediatric syrup
were used up, even though paediatric tablets also exist,
these were not provided to the patients. Various orders
were delayed because of managers’ negligence. Some-
times managers were unaware of their centre’s average
monthly consumption levels, with the result that pur-
chase orders were not updated to reflect real increases in
needs. On the other hand, we observed that certain
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malfunctions were not due to incompetence, but rather
to a lack of awareness among the professionals. For
example, the task of recording fee exemption data at one
EGD point of sale was assigned to a national service con-
script, but this person was rarely on site, so the forms
accumulated and the transmission of data to the upper
level was delayed.
Thus supplies are allocated randomly and bear no
relation to actual requirements. Urgent purchase orders,
which should be exceptional, have become common.
There are unexplained losses of products. As one CHR
noted, certain practices of health workers result in med-
icines ‘evaporating’:
- Unrecorded removal of medicines: When the post is
very busy, nurses take products for certain patients
directly from the sales counter and sometimes fail to
return with payment.
- Invalid requests for payment: All prescriptions issued
under the fee exemption policy must be given a collec-
tion number prior to being filled. However, some nurses
put false numbers on the orders to procure medicines
wrongfully. When these orders are discovered at the
administrative level, they become ineligible for reimbur-
sement under the fee exemption system and result in
losses for the healthcare facility.
- Falsified prescriptions for non-exempted patients sub-
mitted under the fee exemption account: This is often
done to help a relative avoid paying for drugs, or else to
inflate the bill for reimbursement. Parents also lie about
their children’s ages so as to benefit from the fee
exemption. Likewise, very short visits have been known
to occur in which no medicines were given out, but for
which the State was nevertheless charged. All of this
undermines the reliability of the data provided by the
healthcare facilities to the statistical data processing ser-
vices and to the central fee exemption unit.
These malfunctions in the management of medicines
point to a problem with control upstream in the system.
Despite the existence of mechanisms for the purpose–
supervision, physical separation of fee exemption and
cost-recovery EGDs, monitoring software (Sage)–there is
an almost total lack of control. These mechanisms are
either not spoken about or not known, and the attitude
towards contraventions is lax. Jaffré explains that “every-
one belongs to different networks of influence, which dis-
courages complaints” (author’s translation) [25]. Very
often, contraventions are not punished. Health centres
are places where official norms and everyday practices
are interwoven and give rise to a “local professional cul-
ture” among health workers that is often far removed
from regulations and procedures [23]. This impunity is at
the root of the widespread absence of strict control or
monitoring. These structural malfunctions, the legacy of
a health system that has undergone numerous reforms,
cannot be rectified with a simple wave of the hand, and
they weigh heavily on any new health policy introduced,
such as fee exemption.
Coping strategies and adverse effects
Faced with the contradictions and shortcomings of the
fee exemption policy, health workers have developed a
range of coping strategies:
- Some seek out local partners, in particular NGOs,
for support in implementing annual programmes of
activities; such support may be sporadic or sustained.
- Prescriptions are issued according to product avail-
ability. Tablets and capsules in adult doses are given
to children (paediatric syrups being far more
expensive).
- Referrals between CSIs, from CSIs to the district
hospital or, vice versa, from the district hospital to
CSIs, have become frequent simply due to the lack
of EGDs.
- Prescriptions are given to the beneficiaries of fee
exemption, who must then fill them at private phar-
macies, where they are required to pay for their
medicines.
While these coping strategies may make it possible to
continue providing care despite all the problems, they
can also have undesired effects on patient management–
e.g. patients roaming from one healthcare facility to
another in search of treatment; prescriptions not being
paid; inappropriate medicines being dispensed whose
efficacy is not assured.
As mentioned, the cost recovery system operates
through the general application of user fees. According
to the health workers, the price charged is much less
than the actual cost of treating patients who present with
serious complications. These patients consume a lot of
products, and the reagents required for their laboratory
tests are expensive. Although some informants noted
that, conversely, the cost of treating other, less serious ill-
nesses is less than the fee charged, they all subscribe to
the view expressed to us by a community worker in
Gaweye DS that the fixed-price user fee “has become
cheaper for the population and more expensive for the
centre!” In some health centres, the strategy used to over-
come this perceived shortfall involves selling products to
paying patients who did not consult at the healthcare
facility. The perverse effects of this situation include the
sale of certain medicines (e.g. ciprofloxacin, cloxacillin,
penicillin G benzathine injectable suspension, ampicillin)
to all patients, whether or not they qualify for exemption,
and the classification of users as ‘costly’, ‘very costly’ and
‘cheap’. Hence, fee exemption beneficiaries, who could be
treated in ambulatory care services but are classified as
‘costly’, are recorded in the register as being ‘placed
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under observation’, as this qualifies for higher reimburse-
ment under the fee exemption policy. Moreover, it
appears paying patients are less badly treated than those
targeted by the fee exemption policy:
“You arrive at night and knock at the door and they
don’t even answer, or they tell you to come back, there
are no products, particularly when fee exemption is
involved. But if you intend to pay, they get up, although
with an offended air, unwillingly, and treat you.”
(Woman, 35, housewife and mother of five children)
In a context in which users’ anonymity exposes them
to the risk of maltreatment in the health system [26],
this account sounds a warning regarding the emergence
of a form of inequality of treatment between paying
patients and those who qualify for fee exemption. This
commercial logic, which has developed within the health
system over the years, has led to extreme situations in
which treatment is refused to patients who are
exempted from fees. To our knowledge, these perverse
effects have not been sufficiently examined, at a time
when the international community plans to develop uni-
versal health coverage on the African continent [27,28].
It is already known that in the Northern Hemisphere,
where many countries have extensive experience with
universal health coverage (UHC), the refusal of treat-
ment to beneficiaries of supplementary UHC is one of
the persistent bottlenecks in this system [29].
Conclusion
The difficulties experienced by the State due to the lack
of financial and technical resources prior to implementa-
tion of the fee exemption policy have aggravated the
health system’s structural malfunctions. Drug shortages
at the service delivery points are the most visible out-
come of the financial deficit. This tends to obscure, at
the international level, the problems related to the Niger-
ien State’s capacity to supply medicines, manage their
flow, and distribute them equitably in all health districts.
Moreover, the policy’s success does not depend only on
the availability of financing and of EGDs, but also on the
performance of the basic healthcare structures, which
need to be strengthened to improve quality of care and
treatment of complicated cases [30,31]. While health poli-
cies are often expected to have positive effects on the pro-
vision of care, little consideration is given to the health
workers: “Beyond all the talk, they want to see impacts in
terms of their own careers, remuneration and develop-
ment” (authors’ translation) [32]. Advocacy, awareness-
raising, and debate with these front-line workers were all
neglected in the policy implementation process. Any
change in the orientation of health policies must necessa-
rily take into account their actual practices, strategies, and
capacity to obstruct implementation. In effect, because
they are at the heart of the policy implementation process,
they also have the power to act positively or negatively on
these policies, directly or indirectly [33]. Reforms have a
greater chance of success if their formulation and imple-
mentation are discussed in detail in advance with the staff.
In the cases we studied, such preliminary work would
have helped dispel misunderstandings around the see-
mingly contradictory principles of cost recovery and fee
exemption. The pilot experiences were not taken into
account in the government’s implementation of the fee
exemption policy [34]. Lastly, fee exemption is presented
as one of the means of achieving the broader objective of
universal healthcare coverage [35]. This universal coverage
is expected to be achieved through the development of
health mutuals, the promotion of health insurance, and
the establishment of a social health fund. However, if the
internal and external funds required to support this plan
are not protected, and if greater attention is not paid to
actual front-line care practices and the health system’s
current malfunctions, there is a risk that it will produce
the same negative impacts as those generated by the cur-
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